The US Army In Vietnam

The US Army in Vietnam is an illustrated history of an enormous military organisation taking its helicopters, tanks, artillery, computers, field kitchens, paperwork and confident strategic assumptions into a country that declined to behave as predicted.

Leroy Thompson traces the American Army’s involvement from the early advisory missions and Special Forces operations through the great expansion of the 1960s, when “a limited commitment” developed the unfortunate habit of requiring another division, another airfield and several hundred thousand additional men. What began as assistance to South Vietnam became a vast war involving conventional battles, guerrilla operations, pacification programmes and an increasingly urgent search for a measurement capable of looking like progress.

The Army arrived with extraordinary resources. Helicopters made troops mobile across mountains, jungle and rice paddies; artillery bases could deliver devastating fire support; engineers constructed roads, bridges, camps and airstrips; and an immense logistical system supplied American forces with almost everything except a convincing route to victory. No previous army had moved so much material so quickly into such difficult terrain, though moving it all home again would eventually prove rather easier than explaining what it had achieved.

Central to the story is the helicopter, particularly the ubiquitous UH-1 Huey, which carried soldiers into battle, evacuated casualties and supplied isolated positions while providing the Vietnam War with its permanent soundtrack. Airmobility promised commanders the ability to strike anywhere, although “anywhere” had a distressing tendency to contain an enemy who had also read the map. Thompson examines how American units adapted their organisation and tactics to a battlefield where front lines were often theoretical and the enemy could disappear into jungle, villages or tunnels.

The book covers infantry operations alongside artillery, armour, aviation, engineers, medical services and the Green Berets. Special Forces worked with indigenous troops in remote areas, conventional formations undertook search-and-destroy missions, and armoured vehicles discovered that Vietnam contained more terrain suitable for tracks than early planners had confidently assumed. Whenever one branch developed a solution, the war thoughtfully produced a different problem.

Major campaigns and battles are placed within the larger development of the conflict, including the arrival of American combat units, the fighting around the Central Highlands, the Tet Offensive and the gradual transfer of responsibility under Vietnamisation. Tet was presented as a military defeat for the communist forces and nevertheless transformed American public opinion, demonstrating the awkward distinction between winning numerous engagements and winning the war in which they occur.

Thompson also considers the experience of the ordinary soldier serving a one-year tour in a conflict whose political purposes grew increasingly obscure. Units continually lost experienced men and absorbed replacements, while commanders rotated through assignments quickly enough to gain experience shortly before leaving. The institutional calendar advanced with admirable precision even when the strategic calendar appeared to be going backwards.

This is not merely a sequence of famous battles. It is a study of how the US Army organised, equipped and employed its forces, from the individual infantryman to the sprawling command structure above him. Photographs and detailed text show uniforms, weapons, vehicles, helicopters, field positions and the machinery of a war that was simultaneously primitive at ground level and technologically extravagant overhead.

Published by David & Charles in 1990, The US Army in Vietnam provides a broad, accessible account for readers interested in the Vietnam War, American military history, tactics, equipment and the complicated relationship between overwhelming firepower and elusive political objectives. It is particularly suitable for anyone who has wondered how an army could win most of its battles yet leave the war to historians, politicians and veterans to argue over indefinitely.

This copy is in Very Good condition, showing only light evidence of previous ownership and remaining clean, sound and ready for another tour of duty. Sold by Crappy Old Books, whose logistics remain less impressive than those of the US Army, but whose strategic objective—getting the correct book into a padded envelope—is at least reasonably clear.

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